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CASE COMMENTS
applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel between cases such as
Eagle and Teitelbaum wherein the criminal defendant is the plain-
tiff in the subsequent civil action, and cases such as Interstate wherein
the criminal defendant is ,the defendant in the subsequent civil action.
The courts should embrace within the doctrine of collateral estoppel
cases wherein the criminal defendant seeks to recover in a civil action,
when he has been previously convicted of a wrong. The main ob-
stacles to be overcome are the technical requirements that mutuality
and identity of parties must exist, for behind the phrase of collateral
estoppel lies a rule of reason and practical necessity, not to be cir-
cumvented by technical rules.33 The courts should not disregard the
fundamental theory inherent in the basic doctrine of collateral
estoppel.
RICHARD L. RosE
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS FOR FAILURE OF
SUBJACENT SUPPORT
Where ownership of the underlying mineral is severed from
ownership of the surface,' the mineral owner has a duty to maintain
enough subjacent support to prevent subsidence of the surface.? This
duty is absolute,3 and unless ,the surface owner waives his right to
support,4 the care or skill with which the mineral owner operates his
mine will not affect his responsibility.5 The right to subjacent support
is not a contract right, but rather it arises out of ownership of the sur-
-Good Health Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 18, 9 N.E.2d 1758
(1937).
'Banks v. Tennessee Mineral Prods. Corp., 202 N.C. 4o8, 163 S.E. io8 (1932).
2Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Young, 188 Ark. 191, 65 S.W.2d 1074 (1933); Em-
pire Star Mines Co. v. Butler, 62 Cal. App. 2d 466, 145 P.2d 49 (1944); Brooke v.
Dellinger, 193 Ga. 66, 17 S.E.2d 178 (1941); Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 347
Pa. 290, 32 A.2d 227 (1943); Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Compton, 148 Va. 437, 139
S.E. 3o8 (1927).
31Voodward Iron Co. v. Mumpower, 248 Ala. 502, 28 So. 2d 625 (1946); North-
East Coal Co. v. Hayes, 244 Ky. 639, 51 S.W.2d 96o (1932).
"Mason v. Peabody Coal Co., 320 Ill. App. 350, 51 N.E.2d 285 ('943); Pennsyl-
vania Coal & Coke Corp. v. Duncan-Spangler Coal Co., 333 Pa. 272, 3 A.2d 356
(1939); Continental Coal Co. v. Connellsville By-Prod. Coal Co., 104 IV. Va. 44, 138
S.E. 737 (1927).
5Paris Purity Coal Co. v. Pendergrass, 193 Ark. 1031, 104 S.W.2d 455 (1937);
Peters v. Bellingham Coal Mines, 173 Wash. 123, 21 P.2d 1024 (1933).
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face.6 The suface owner can demand that all of the subjacent mineral
be left unmined if it is necessary to support his land.7
The absolute duty to maintain sufficient subjacent support is rec-
ognized in all jurisdictions.8 However, it appears that only five juris-
dictions have ruled on the question of when the surface owner's cause
of action accrues and when the statute of limitations, therefore, begins
to run .against him.9 Of these five, a majority of four hold that a cause
of action does not accrue and the statute of limitations does not begin
to run until the surface has actually been damaged, i.e., until there
has been some subsidence of the overlying soil.10 The states that follow
this view, which is the same as the English rule of Backhouse v. Bon-
omi," consider the surface owner's right to the ordinary undisturbed
enjoyment of his land to be of primary importance. The mineral
owner merely has a right to mine the underlying strata so long as he
does not interfere with the surface. When the surface caves in, the
surface owner's enjoyment is disturbed, and it is then that his cause
of action arises.' 2 At least one decision, following the English rule, is
based upon the theory that removal of the subjacent support may
remain unknown to the surface owner until his land has in fact sub-
sided.13
Apparently, Pennsylvania stands alone as the only state that holds
a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run
at the time the underlying support is removed. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania held in Noonan v. Pardee'4 that the subsidence was
merely ,the consequence of the previous act of removing the necessary
support, which when removed, violated the duty and gave rise to the
OCarlin & Co. v. Chappel, 1ol Pa. 348 (1882).
'Evans Fuel Co. v. Leyda, 77 Colo. 356, 236 Pac. 1023 (1925); Whiles v. Grand
Junction Mining &c Fuel Co., 86 Coo. 418, 282 Pac. 26o (1929).
8in Pennsylvania, the right to subjacent support may exist as a separate right
in someone other ttan the surface or the mineral owner. In such a situation,
the servitude of support is referred to as a "third estate." Charnetski v. Miner's
Mills Coal Mining Co., 270 Pa. 459, 115 Atl. 683 (19i1); Smith v. Glen Alden Coal
Co., 347 Pa. 29o, 32 A.2d (1943).
9Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Kansas and Pennsylvania. See notes 1o and 14
infra.
"West Pratt Coal Co. v. Dorman, 161 Ala. 389, 49 So. 849 (19o9); Western
Coal &c Mining Co. v. Randolph, 191 Ark. 1115, 89 S.W.2d 741 (1936); Wanless v.
Peabody Coal Co., 294 Ill. App. 401, 13 N.E.2d 996 (1938); Treece v. Southern Gem
Coal Corp., 245 I1. App. 113 (1923); Walsh v. Kansas Fuel Co., 1o2 Kan. 5, 169
Pac. 219 (1917); Audo v. Western Coal & Mining Co., 99 Kan. 454, 162 Pac. 344
(1917).
29 H.L. Gas. 5o3, 11 Eng. Rep. 825 (1861).
225 Harv. L. Rev. 574 (19o2).
"West Pratt Coal Co. v. Dorman, 161 Ala. 389, 49 So. 849 (19o9).
''2oo Pa. 474, 5o Atl. 255 (19o).
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cause of action. The Pennsylvania court, holding that the six-year
statute of limitations began to run at the time the underlying mineral
was removed, said:
"It is argued ,that in some cases the surface owner could not
know by the most careful observation whether the mine owner
had neglected his duty within six years. We answer, that is only
one of the incidents attending the purchase of land over coal
mines. It is not improbable that this risk enters largely into the
commercial value of all like surface land in that region. But,
however this may be, we hold that the miner is not forever an-
swerable for even his own default.... Neither law nor equity
demands that any greater burden should be placed upon him
than that indicated. Any heavier one would encourage the
purchase of surface over coal mines for speculation in future
lawsuits."15
The Noonan doctrine was followed by Pennsylvania's highest court
in Tischler v. Pennsylvania Coal Co.16 and Woods v. Pittsburgh Coal
Co. 17 The more recent case of City of Carbondale v. Hudson Coal Co.is
clearly shows that Pennsylvania continues to stand firmly behind the
Noonan rule. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the application of this
rule places an impossible burden upon -the surface owner. In situa-
tions where he obviously should be granted relief, he is left with
either an insufficient remedy or no remedy at all. The various prob-
lems presented by the Pennsylvania doctrine can best be demonstrated
by considering the following hypothetical situation. First, assume
that there is active mining below the surface and that the surface
owner realizes the duty ,to support his land may be violated. It is likely
that notice of an actual violation might not come to his attention
through subsidence until after the statute of limitations has run.
Must the surface owner assume this risk? It is obvious that he must
unless there is some course of action open to him at this -time.
One possible course of action may be to seek an injunction to re-
strain the mine owner from removing the necessary support.' 9 Such a
remedy is ordinarily given if a multiplicity of suits at law would there-
by be avoided. However, in the Woods case, the Pennsylvania court
refused an injunction because the court felt that a multiplicity of suits
2B1d. at 257.
12i8 Pa. 82, 66 Atl. 988 (19o7).
2'23o Pa. 197, 79 Adt. 499 (1911).
"The court, in reference to the Noonan rule, said: "Mhis is a sad and unsound
legal principle but is too well and too long established in Pennsylvania law to be
open to challenge." 58 Lack. Jur. 233, 237 (1957).
'1 Gatson v. Farber Fire Brick Co., 219 Mo. App. 558, 282 S.W. 179 (925); Greek
Catholic Congregation v. Wilson Coal Co., 329 Pa. 341, 198 Ad. 41 (1938).
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might riot result from denying injunctive relief.20 The court said
that one action at law might provide an adequate remedy if and when
the mine owner breaches his duty. In other words, one lawsuit might
be enough to convince the mine owner that he should stop mining
that portion of the mineral necessary to support the surface.
If the court decides that, contrary to the Pennsylvania view, the
surface owner is entitled to a restraining injunction, another ques-
tion arises. How much mineral must be left unmined to maintain
sufficient subjacent support? The answer to this question requires a
finding based upon expert testimony.2 1 In all due respect to the min-
ing engineering profession, it is submitted that a decision of this na-
ture would contain an element of conjecture. 22 It is much more like-
ly that a determination of the amount of support required will be
based entirely upon past experience in similar situations. Even if the
surface owner is granted an injunction, he may nevertheless suffer
damage through subsidence because the expert opinion was not ac-
curate and the estimated support was not in fact sufficient. If this sub-
sidence occurs more than six years after the necessary support was re-
moved, the surface owner in a Pennsylvania jurisdiction is left with-
out a right of action.
An entirely different course of action is available to the surface
owner if he believes the necessary support has already been removed.
Since the Pennsylvania courts hold that a cause of action accrues im-
mediately upon the mine owner's failure to maintain adequate sup-
port, the surface owner can -thereupon bring an action to recover com-
pensatory damages. 23 Here again, the question of what constitutes
sufficient support is presented. Although this issue never arises in
jurisdictions that follow the English view, the Pennsylvania surface
owner has the burden of proving that the unmined portion of the
mineral is not sufficient to support his overlying land. If the surface
owner cannot prove this element of his cause of action, he fails to es-
tablish 'his case, 24 and under 'the principle of res judicata, the mine
owner escapes all liability for future subsidence that occurs because
the duty to support had in fact been violated.
On the other hand, assume that the surface owner convinces the
jury that his right to support has been violated. If the surface has
20It is interesting to note that this same opinion cites the Noonan v. Pardee
doctrine with approval.
2'Degenhart v. Gent, Adm'r, 97 Il. App. 145 (1901).
2Dallas Land & Loan Co. v. Garrett, 276 S.W. 471 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
2Woods v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 230 Pa. 197, 79 Ad. 499 (19t1).
9'Deep Vein Coal Co. v. Dowdle, 218 Ind. 495, 33 N.E.2d 981 (1941).
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not yet subsided, what is the surface owner's measure of damages? It
is generally accepted that recovery of more than nominal damages
is not allowed where the question of actual damages can be resolved
only through speculation.25 Mr. Justice Willes, in the English case
of Bononi v. Backhouse,26 said:
"[The contention] on behalf of the defendant is, that the ac-
tion must be brought within six years after the excavation is
made, and ,that it is immaterial whether any actual damage has
occurred or not. The jury, according to this view, would have
therefore to decide upon the speculative question, Whether
any damage was likely to arise; and it might well be that in
many cases they would, upon the evidence of mineral survey-
ors and engineers, find that no damage was likely to occur,
when the most serious injury afterwards might in fact occur,
and in others find and give large sums of money for appre-
hended damage, which in point of fact never might arise. This
is certainly not a state of the law to be desired.127
Other vertical support cases that have disallowed prospective dam-
ages for future subsidence are Jackson Hill Coal & Coke Co. v. Bales2 8
and Catlin Coal Co. v. Lloyd.29 Even the Pennsylvania court in the
Woods case indicated that a judgment against the mine owner before
the surface subsides is a mere vindication of the surface owner's right
to support. It seems then, that when the duty to support has been
violated but no subsidence has occurred, the Pennsylvania surface
owner can at the most recover only nominal damages.30 This is cer-
tainly an insufficient remedy for a later collapse of the surface.
Although no cases can be found directly on point,8' it is apparent
that once the Pennsylvania surface owner recovers nominal damages
and thereby establishes a violation of his legal right to support, any
further action by him may be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 32
Pennsylvania regards the surface owner's cause of action to be founded
upon removal of support and not upon damages to the surface. It fol-
'Boyle v. Bay, 81 Colo. 125, 254 Pac. 156 (1927).
mE.B. &- E. 646, 12o Eng. Rep. 652 (Ex. 1859). This decision in the Exchequer
Chamber was later affirmed in the House of Lords case of Backhouse v. Bonomi,
supra note 11.
2Id. at 657.
*x83 Ind. 276, io8 N.E. 962 (19t5).
"'124 II. App. 394 (906)-
"Duggan v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 159 Pa. 248, 28 Atl. 182 (1893).
"mCf. Guzzi v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 256 Fed. 719 (M.D. Pa. 1gg), aff'd
266 Fed. 513 (3d Cir. 1920).
3'Harris v. Harris, 296 Ky. 41, 176 S.WT.2d 98 (1943); Watkins v. Sorrento Restau-
rants, 296 Ky. 115, 176 S.W.2d 251 (1943).
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lows that, unless additional support is removed subsequent to the first
suit, a second suit will involve the identical cause of action and thus
be barred.33 This is an important consideration since the surface may
subside between the date of the original judgment and the date of ex-
piration of the statute of limitations. If the previous judgment is res
judicata, the Pennsylvania surface owner is far better off not to bring
an action for damages until immediately prior to the running of the
statute. By so doing, he can at least recover compensatory damages
for all subsidence that occurs within six years of the date the duty to
support was violated.
In order to point out the unfortunate effects of the Noonan doc-
trine, the least favorable situation has been assumed. It must be ad-
mitted that, if the surface is ever going to subside, it is most likely
to do so within six years of the failure to maintain adequate support.
Nevertheless, it is possible for subsidence of the surface to be delayed
for at least six years either through natural forces or by substituting
some form of temporary support to supplement the remaining natural
support, thereby permitting the miner to extract a greater portion
of the mineral. This presents the problem of whether Pennsylvania
would consider the cause of action to accrue at the time the tempo-
rary support is substituted for the mineral or at the time the temporary
support fails.3 4 The court did not disclose whether or not this problem
was considered when deciding the Noonan case.
The result is that Pennsylvania has established a legal principle
that completely disregards the basic rule that the surface owner is en-
titled to the undisturbed use and enjoyment of his land. It is there-
fore submitted that the English rule of Blackstone v. Bonomi, followed
by a majority of the states which have decided ,this question, is by far
the more desirable one. Under this rule, the surface owner's cause of
action cannot be barred by the statute of limitations before his land
subsides. Lt eliminates the necessity of deciding before subsidence oc-
33Long v. Stout, 305 Pa. 31o, 157 At. 6o7 (1931); Bassis v. Rutenberg, 177 Pa.
Super. 339, xo A.2d 897 (1955). But cf. Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp.,
349 U.S. 322 (1955).
'It seems logical that, if the support is truly temporary and it is intended to
be replaced with permanent support, there is an element of good faith and the
duty has not been violated. On the other hand, if the temporary support is in-
stalled in a section of the mine that will be sebsequently abandoned and become
inaccessible, there is obviously a showing of bad faith. In such a situation, the
surface owner's cause of action should not accrue until the temporary support fails.
This further complicates the problem since it may be impossible to determine
when the temporary support fails. Note, however, that this issue can arise only in
a Pennsylvania-type jurisdiction.
